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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
FLOYD HARMER, STANLEY D. ROBER TS,
G. MARION HINCKLEY, as the Board of
County Commissioners for Utah County,
and as the County Board of Equalization,
and as individual taxpayers in Utah County;
HARRISON CONOVER, as Utah County
Assessor; EL WOOD L. SUNDBERG, as
Utah County Auditor; MAURICE C. BIRD,
as Utah County Treasurer; C. STEVEN
HATCH, as a resident and taxpayer of Utah >- Case No.
11369
County,
I
Plaintiffs, Appellants and
Cross-Respondents,
vs.
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Defendant, Respondent and
Cross-Appellant.

PETITION FOR RE-HEARING
Appellant respectfully petitions the Court for a rehearing
and reconsideration of the decision in this case filed April 2,
1969.

This petition is based upon the following grounds:
The Court erred as a matter of law because there was
no showing that the State Tax Commission acted with an in1.
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tentional, systematic, deliberate or fraudulent design to discriminate and thereby violate fundamental constitutional anJ
legislative principles. And absent such showing the majority
opinion should, as a matter of law, adopt and reflect Justice
Crockett's dissent requiring such a finding before the acts of
the Commission can be overturned.
2. This Court held that there was no plan or program
or revaluation in existance. The provisions of Utah Code Annotated 59- 5-46. I, require no written plan, and this Court should
grant administrativ~ agencies latitude in determining how they
are to fulfill their respective duties, in the absence of a showing
of bad faith, or fraudulent purpose.
3. The action of the State Tax Commission in revaluing
Provo-Orem properties was an honest, good faith effort by said
Commission to effectuate the substantial equality in land valuations and taxation required by Article XIII, Section 3, of the
Utah Constitution, as well as the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
4. This Court erred in voiding the attempts of the State
Tax Commission to achieve substantial equality by beginning
in those areas most undervalued and most in need of equalization. The Court, by its decision, has effectively assured the
continued inequality in land valuation which is contrary to the
Constitution and laws of the State of Utah.
5. If allowed to stand, the decision of this Court will work
a great burden and hardship upon those taxpayers who presently shoulder a greater load due to unequal valuations, and will
greatly hamper the efforts of the State Tax Commission to fulfill its duties. The recently-adjourned legislature enacted an
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amended vers10n of Utah Code Annotated, 50-5-46.1, (Senate
Bill No. 20), which will require a written plan of revaluation,
and implem~ntation of that law will be greatly hampered, if not
effectively stopped, in light of the Court's opinion herein.
6. A property owner has no right to have his property
undervalued, and in view of the admitted disparity in land valuations of many areas of the State, the effect of this Court's
opinion is to perpetuate, rather than eliminate these disparties.
If the State Tax Commission's program of revaluation is voided in Provo-Orem, that body is powerless to act even in a
flagrant case of misvaluation until granted sufficient funds and
penonnel by the legislature to enable it to revalue all land in
the State in the short span of five years. Even if administratively possible, such an accomplishment would be dubious at
the end of the period, when conceivably the initial assessments
may be gre1tly inequitable when compared with the final as-

sessments completed in the fifth year.
7. The Court's decision is ambiguous in that it leaves unanswered the issue of whether the Commission can make emergency or spot revaluations in those counties not undergoing a
cyclical revaluation program in order to correct gross misvaluations. If the Commission does undertake such emergency revaluations, must the Commission, having entered the county on
an emergency basis, completely revalue the entire county?

8. The Court's opinion seems to require that the State
Tax Commission must complete its five-year revaluation program before adding any of the revalued property to the tax
rolls. If this is the intention of the Court, its decision will not
only greatly hamper the discharge of petitioner's duty to assure
equal valuJtion, but it is contrary to the weight of case law in
this area.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ACTIONS OF THE STA TE TAX COMMISSION
IN REVALUING REAL PROPERTY CANNOT BE ATTACKED AS VIOLATING EQUAL PROTECTION OR THE
JUST VALUATION REQUIREMENT OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION, AR TI CLE XIII, SECTION 3, IN THE
ABSENCE OF A SHOWING OF A SYSTEMATIC, DELIBERA T, INTENTIONAL OR FRAUDULENT DESIGN TO
VIOLATE TE:OSE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES.
Mr. Justice Crockett's able dissent has focused on a key
element of this case.
"But from what has been made to appear, I am not
persuaded that the Tax Commission has been arbitrary, unreasonable or discriminatory in proceeding
toward the desired objective."
Dissenting Opinion, Hanna, ct al v. State Tax Commission, No. 11369, April 2, 1969, p.4.
In a recent A.LR. annotation, the problem of constitutional challenges to revaluation programs was summed up as follows:
" .. the question of violation of constitutional right
is largely one of the presence or absence of actual
intention to discriminate, despite the fact of substantial, and in some instances great, inequality in taxation necessarily resulting from only partial application of new values." 76 A.LR. 2d, at 1077, (emphasis
supplied); see also; 51 Am. Jur. "Taxation," Section
170, et seq.

The ba~ic priniciples of law applicable to this case are set
forth in Sunday Lake Iron Company t'. Township of Wakefield,
247 U.S. 350, 38 S. Ct. 495, 62 L.Ed. 1154 (1918). The state
of Michigan had valued appellant's mining lands at full value
for tax purposes, whereas most other property was valued at onethird marke~ value.
While recognizing th2t an intentional, systematic undervaluation contravenes the constitutional rights of one taxed
at full value, (id., at 352-353,) the Court required the following burden of proof of one challenging a valuation on constitutional grounds:
" [One must show] something which in effect
amounts to an intentional violation of the essential
principal of practical uniformity. The good faith of
such officers and the 11alidity of their actions are presumed; when assailed, the burden of proof is upon the
complaining party."
Id., at 353, (emphasis supplied).

Further delineation of the burden upon one challenging
valuations by taxing officials was expressed in Liggett Company
u. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 53 S. Ct. 481, 77 L.Ed. 929 (1933),
which required an intentional and systematic undervaluation
to sustain such a challenge, which requirement can only be met
by evidence of a clear and hostile discrimination against particular persons and classes. Td,. at 539-540.
When our sister state of Wyoming valued property of the
Chicago and Northwestern Railway at 113 113 per cent of actual value, as compared with the usual 60 per cent of actual
Yalue assigned to other types of property, the railroad challenged the State's action as a violation of the Equal Protection
CLrnse. The Supreme Court held that there must be an intent
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or fraudulent purpose to disregard the fundamental principle
of uniformity before activities of taxing authorities would be
considered violation of Equal Protection. The Court said it
was not discriminatory to undervalue other property. Rowley
v. Chicago N N. W. Ry., 293 U.S. 102, 111, 5 5 S. Ct. 55, 79
L.Ed. 222 ( 1934).
One of the best statements of the law in our area of inquiry is in Great Northern Ry. v. Weeks, 297 U.S. 135, 56 S.
Ct. 426, 80 L.Ed. 532 (1936), a North Dakota tax-valuation
case.
"Overvaluation is not of itself sufficient to warrant
injunction against any part of taxes based on the
challenged assessment; mere error of judgment is not
enough; there must be something that in legal effect
is the equivalent of intention or fraudulent purpose
to overvalue the property."

Id., at 139, (emphasis supplied).
Admittedly, these cases were concerned with the application of the Equal Protection Clause, but a comparable line of
cases construing State constitutional provisions similar to Utah's
Article XIII has reached the same result, and requires a showing of a fraudulent, intentional, systematic design to discriminate before one may successfully challenge the actions of taxing authorities.

Alfred J. .Sweet, Jnr. v. City of Auburn, 180 A. 803, 805
( 193 5), speakes of a sys::-ematic purpose to cast a disproportionate share of the tax burden on one or a group of taxpayers
as the only justification for judicial interference in this area,
requiring "intentional violation of the essential principle of
practical uniformity."
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The mere fact that one person's property is assessed at its
full value and that of others at less than full value, even though
the statutes 8llow no such discrimination, raises no constitutional question, said the court in Lubbock Hotel Co. v. Lubbock
Independent School District, 8) S. W. 2d 776 (1935). Before
the court will interfere, it must appear that a rule or system
of valuation has been adopted by the assessing authority which
was designed to operate unequ:illy and to violate a fundamental
constitutional principle. Id., at 778. The fraud requirement in
Lubbock was defined a3 a conscious failure to exercise the fair
and impartial judgement the law requires of assessing officers.
Id.
Arizona requires that the improper administration of valuations be deliberate to sustain a challenge of taxing authorities' actions. Duhame v. State Tax Commission, 179 P.2d 252,
261 (1947).

Skinner v. New Mexico State Tax Commission, 66 New
Mexico 221, 345 P.2d 750 (1959), is the main case in an annotafrm in 76 A.LR. 2d 1077.
There the county assessor valued 20% of the county real
property at the uniform rate of 16% of market value, while
80% of the properties on the tax rolls were valued from 1 %
to 166% of market value.
In refusing a property owners challenge of the valuations,
based on the New Mexico Constitution, Article VIII, Section
1; the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the taxpayer must
show either a well-defined and established scheme of discrimination or some fraudulent action. 345 P.2d, at 752.
"Taxes levied upon tangible property shall be in proportion to the value thereof, and taxes shall be equal
and uniform upon subjects of taxation of the same

class." N.M.S. Annotated, 1953, Vol. I, at 176.
The following is provided for in the Constitution of the
State of Missouri: "Taxes . . . shall be uniform upon the same
class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority
levymg the tax." Article X, Section 3, R.S.Mo. 1959, vol. 4
at 4844.
The limits of the courts to intervene in land revaluation
by tax authorities was clearly deliniated by the Missouri court
in May Department Stores Co. v. State Tax Commission, 308
2d 748 (1958).

s.w.

"The court may not sit m judgment on the opinion
and estimates of duly constituted taxing officials and
substitute their own opinions. (Citations omitted.)
So far as excessiveness is concerned, the assessment
must be so grossly excessive as to be entirely inconsistent with an honest exercise of judgment before the
courts rnay intervene."

Id., at 764.
On the degree of discrimination necessary to invalidate a
tax official's actions, Crothers v. County of Santa Cruz, (California 1st District Court of Appeals,) 151 Cal. App. 2d 219,
311 P.2d 5 57 ( 19 57), is instructive.
"The essential question with respect to the assessment
of properties of the same or different classes to be determined is as to whether the provisions of the Constitution regarding uniformity in valuation and of the
laws declaring how uniformity and equality in the
distribution of the burdens of taxation are to be ascertained and applied have been fairly conformed to
or systematically, and intentionally disregarded."
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Id., at 561 citings Mahoney v. City of San Diego, 198
California 388, 398, 245 P.2d 189, 193 (1926), which required such a degree of discrimination as to evince a willfull and
systematic disregard of federal and state constitutional requirements. Id., ;it 192.
Clearly, in light of the facts of this case, the actions of
State Tax Commission officials in the Provo-Orem area were
not the result of a deliberate, systematic, intentional, fradulent design to violat~ Equai Protection and the uniformity and
equality required in l:md valuations by Article XIII, Section
3, of the Utah Constitution. As a matter of law, Mr. Justice
Crockett's dissenting opinion should be incorporated into the
majority opinion, to reflect the failure of the Utah County
plaintiffs to meet the burden of showing an intentional violation of fundamental principles of uniformity or equality in
land valuations.
Petitioner respectfully mbmits that this Court erred in
not recognizing that the efforts of the State Tax Commission
under challenge were in fact, good faith efforts by that administrative body to fulfill its statutory and constitutional duty.
This Court held that no plan or program existed, but Utah
Code Annotated 59- 5-46.1 requires no written plan, and this
Court should grant the Commission latitude in determining
how it is to fulfill its duties, absent a showing of bad faith or
rrrndulent purpose.
Is it not more likely, in the absence of any showing of an
''intentional violation of the essential prinicple of practical
uniformity," Sunday Lake Iron, supra, that the State Tax
Commission's revaluation of properties in the Provo-Orem area
w.1s in reality a good faith effort, halted by this suit, to hasten
the time when all real property in Utah is valued and taxed,
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as the Constitution requires, uniformly and equally? And
would not this Court better serve both the constitutional principles, and its concerns for reascn:ible uniformity and equality
announced in Harmer, rt al v. State Tax Commission, by sustaining this first attempt of the State Tax Commission to equalize land valuations?
We respectfully urge this Court to do so, and sustain petitioner's contentions that the earlier decision was erroneous in
its application of the law to the facts of this case.
POINT II.
THE REVALUATION OF PROVO-OREM PROPER TY
WAS AN HONEST, GOOD FAITH ATTEMPT ON THE
PART OF THE STA TE TAX COMMISSION TO FULFILl
THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF SUBSTANTIAL EQUALITY IN LAND EVALUATIONS.
That good faith is the most important element in the working of a tax bo.1rd is a priniciple all will recognize. The actions
of a tax board in a situation so sensitive as land revaluation invade a precious area: individual property rights, long recognized as one of man's basic, inherent rights.
The good faith of taxing officials is presumed. Sunday
Lake Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield, op.Cit., at 353;
Interstate Oil Pipcline Co. l'. Guilbeau, 46 So. 113 ( 19 50).
In the Sunday La.kc Ircm Case, cited supra at page 5, the
court said the following of the tax commission's efforts in valuing the company's property at full value, other lands at onethird of value.
"Its action is not incompatible with an honest effort
in new and difficult circumstances to adopt valuations not relatively unjust or unequal."
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Id., at 353.
Petitioner respectfully submits to this court that such an
malysis of its activities in the Provo-Orem area are subject tc
the same observation.
Confronted with express constitutional and statutory requirements, of substantial equality of valuation, petitioner recognized a complete lack of uniformity of valuation in the
State. As was pointed out at trial, locally-assessed properties
have been for years assessed at substantially lower rates than
state-assessed properties.
(P. Exh. 3, Def. Exh. 11).
Utah Code Annotated ) 9-5 -47 requires petitioners to equalize the valuation of taxable property in the various counties
of the State.
In a good faith effort to comply, the petitioner began its
program in the Provo-Orem area. Rather than perpetuating or
~ccenting variances in valuation, that effort resulted in bringing
more property values in line with comparable property in o~her
counties.
As Mr. Justice Crockett has observed, "I am not persuaded that the Tax Commission has been arbitrary, unreasonable
or d;scrimin:itory, in proceeding toward the desired objective"
[ cq ualization of property valuations.]." Dissent, 0 pinion, op.
cit., p.4.
Might not this Court more adequately serve to hasten the
day of equality by allowing the efforts of the Tax Commission
to St'.1'1d, "as :m honest effort in new and difficult circumstanc~s Lo adopt valuations not relatively unjust"? Sunday Lake Iron,
r1jJ.cit.
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The Skh111er l'. Nell' Mexico Stale Tax Commission case.
op.cit., presents a situatirm somewhat parallel to the instJnt
case. There a county assessor was faced with unequal valuatiun1
ranging from l % to 166% of market value. The New Mexico
Constitution requires the same substantial equality of assessment
as Utah's. His plan was to assess all property at 16% of market
value, but limitations of fonds and personnel allowed him tn
complete revaluation of only 20% of the property on the tax
rolls. Thus, 80% of the taxpayers paid taxes based on the old,
grossly disparate valuations, while 20% paid a uniform tax based
on the 16% valuation.
In sustaining the assessor's actions, the court found that the
equalization process is a continual one, and that there was nn
need to complete it within one year. As pointed out earlier, the
Court recognized the need of a challenging taxpayer to find ~
well-defined and established scheme of discrimination or some
fraudulent action. 345 P.2d, at 752.
A county Board of Equalization's attempt to increase the
land valuations of designated tracts in only the commerciJI
areas of a city was considered in Ma)' Department Stores Co.
v. State Tax Commjssion, 308 S.W. 2d 748 (1958), a Missouri
case under

J

constitutional provision, op.cit., substantially sim-

ilar to Utah's Art. XIII.
The order increasing land valuations was held not to be in
violation of State and federal constitutional prinicples because
immediate, complete revaluation was impossible, and such an
increase was merely a step toward attaining uniformity of v;1!u1tion. 308 S.\V.2d, at

'~9.

In void:ng the actions of the State Tax Commission in the
Provo-Orem revaluation, this cnurt has effectively sanctioned
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the continu:lnce of the gross inequality so offensive to it, to the
citizens of Utah, and to the Utah Constitution.
As in Skinner, the petitioner herein is severely handicapped
by lack of funds and personnel. To some extent, the 1969 Legi,bturc has allevi:ited that problem in its new version of Utah
Code Annotated § 59- 5-46.1. But petitioner respectfully submits that unless this Court allows it to continue to revalue as
much as funds and personnel limits allow, the State Tax Commission will come to an abrupt halt in its good faith efforts
to equalize valuations in accordance with its statutory and
constitutional obligations.
As the Skinne1· court observed, equalization is a continual
process. Even at the end of the Five year period set forth in
Utah Code Anontated § 59-5-46.1, those properties revalued
Jt the start of the first year, given the normal rise in property
values gener.11ly, will be undervalued vis-a-vis those properties
revalued in the waning hours of the cycle. Are we then to scrap
:ill the past five years' work because we haven't valued all lands
equally? Hardly, for as the Missouri court observed, supra,
immediate complete rev:i.luation is impossible. Instead, the petitioner must act as it secs fit, in good faith, to equalize the most
grossly misvalucd properties first, as a first step of many on
the ro:id to rnbstantial equality and uniformity on a state-wide
basis.
Requiring, as h:is this court, completion of cyclical revaluations in one county at a time, seriously hampers the petitioner
in fulfilling its duties. Petitioner respectfully urges this Court
to reconsider the portion of its opinion on this matter, in the
light of the case law set forth hereinabove, and Mr. Justice
Crockett's dissent, cited previously.
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POINT III.
IF ALLOWED TO ST AND, THIS COURT'S OPINION
THREATENS TO PRECLUDE ANY EFFECTIVE ACTION
BY PETITIONER IN DISCHARGE OF ITS CONSTITUTION AL AND STA TUTOR Y DUTIES.
As a basis for its opinion, this court held that since land
valuations were not sub~t<!ntially uniform or equal in Utah or
Utah County, respondent-taxpayers' properties could not be
added to the tax rolls, despite the fact that the revaluation tended to conform these properties to a more equal valuation vis-avis other like property.
Also, it was expressly stated that the intent of the legislature was to require each revaluation program to be completed
a county at a time.
Carried to its logical conclusion, this line of reasoning seems
to require a full county to be revalued before any properties
can be added to the tax roll. Petitioner respectfully submits
that this extension of logic shows the error of the Court's holding on this point.
Petitioner has cited Skinner v. New Mexico State Tax Commission, supra at page 7, where a county assessor placed revalued properties on his tax rolls along with grossly misvalued
properties.
The Court effectively characterized the nature of the oxpayer's challenge in that instance, which is strikingly parellel
to the inst:mt case.
"Here, appellants have shown no discrimination or
fraud, nor did they ,1sk that all other property be immediately raised in assessed value. On the contrary,
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they sav, in effect, 'we have been under-assessed in
the past and we must continue to be under-assessed
until every other piece of property is placed on the tax
rolls at comparitive, though less than market
values.' "
345 P.2d, at 752.
The Skinner court then answered this contention, as petitioner submits this court should have answered that of respondent -taxpayers, by citing Hamilton v. Adkins, 250 Alabama
757, 35 So.2d 183 (1948), cert.den., 335 U.S. 861. That wellreasoned opinion held that before discrimination violative of
constitutional provisions can be found in assessment or valuation
by taxing authorities.
. . . it is necessary that the action of the administrative officials be more than mere error in judgment
or result in more than inequality in valuation. It must
be shown that the officials are chargeable with a purpose or design to discriminate by a systematic method."
Id., at 184.

For purposes of this pet1t1on, it is important to note that
the Abbama court was considering a revaluation program only
one-fourth completed at the end of the year, due to limitations
in budget and personnel availahle for the task.
Petitioner contends that is is not necessary, in the light of
,lpplicable case bw, for a revaluation program to be completed
before any revalued properties may be added to the tax rolls.
Regrettably, this court's opinion, if allowed to stand, compels a
contrary c0nclusion, and runs counter to the current state of
the hw in this field.
In accord with the Yiews of the Missouri and Alabama
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decisions are two California cases m the First District Court
of Appeals.
Alberts v. Board of Supervisors of County of San Mateo,
193 Cal. App. 2d 225, 14 Cal.Rptr. 72 (1961), hearing denied
by State Supreme Court, August 16, 1961, held that a cyclical
reappraisal program that is not completed is not discriminatory,
and those properties reappraised may be legally added to the
tax rolls before all property has been reappraised. See also: Lord
v. County of Marin, 29 Cal. Rptr. 248 ( 1963).
Petitioner is confronted with a related problem due to
this Court's holding, and respectfully requests the Court to
consider and give petitioner the benefit of its opinion on the
following:
"May the State Tax Commission, in furtherance of
its duty to assure a uniform rate of valuation, revalue property in a county that is not at the time
undergoing the statutory cyclical revaluation program?"
The problem arises when land development takes place in
a county changing the use of the property, often increasing its
value many-fold. For instance, what was once farm land, may
in the space of a few months become a sub-division or shopping
center. If this occurs just after the State Tax Commission has
completed its revaluation program in that county, the property
may be grossly undervalued for as many as five years, unless
the Commission can make a spot-revaluation.
This Court's opinion seems to answer the query in the
negative, but petitioner respectfully urges consideration of the
following points.
1.

Such a holding m effect impedes implimentation of
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the constitutional requirement of substantial equality or uniformity.
2. The case law seems to indicate no violation of constitutional provisions occurs when spot revaluations are undertaken
by taxing authorities.

May DPpartment StorPs Co. v. State Tax Commission, 308
S.W. 2d 7 48 ( 19 5 8), citcJ s11 pra at page 8, was a case under
the Missouri Constitution's Art. X, Sect'.on 3, which requires
substantial uniformity of assessment.
The application of that provision, and the Equal Protection
Clause, to a County Board of Equalization's attempts to increase the land values of designated tracts in only the commercial areas of '.1 city was the concern of the Missourr Court.
The order increasing those specific land valuations was
held to be valid because immediate, complete revaluation was
impossible and such an incre::ise in specific properties was merely a step toward att:lining uniformity of valuation in that area.
Id., ;)t 759.
The State Tax Commission contends that spot revaluations,
made in an honest '.lttempt to fulfill the constitutional standard of equality of valuation, shouid be valid, but that if this
Court's opinion is allowed to stand, serious doubts are present
as to whether such action is possible in Utah.
Petitioner respectfully asks this court to consider this vital
question, and to render an opinion thereon.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner respectfully submits that the majority opm10n
m this case is contrary to accepted legal authority; that the
di,senting orinion of the Honorable Chief Justice Crockett
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correctiy interprets rhe law applicable to the case and should
be adcpted ;:i~ p:.n of the nujority opinion.
The opmion as it now stands perpetuates the very inequities this court found to be so objectionable and opens the door
to continued litig:1rio11 each time a plan of rearpc1_isal is commenced within a county. The effect of such litigation would
be to preclnde :my comprehensive reappraisal program initiated
by rhe Commission or contempbted by the 1969 Utah Legislature when it amended Section 59-5-46.1, Utah Code Annotated.
The decision is 1mbiguous in that it does not cle:uly state
when re-valued property is to be pbced upon the tax rolls nor
does it consider the problems attendant to an expanding economy where property v:ilues change overnight. It appears to
preclude any spot revaluations in counties not being revalued
under a cyclical revalu:ition program, thereby perpetuating
existing and newly :irising inequities.
Petitio11ei- therefore respec1fully urges this honorable court
to recons:der its decision in this case.
Respectfully Submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY

Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Petitioner

